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Hallie E. Bishop 
 
Belcourt Public School District v. Davis affirms a narrower scope of the 
first Montana exception, which provides one of two mechanisms to establish 
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members. Belcourt Public School District 
affirms that the first Montana exception does not apply to State officers or 
entities acting within their governmental capacity, but only to those private 
individuals who voluntarily enter into agreements with a tribe.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Belcourt Public School District v. Davis follows the precedent of 
Montana v. United States, where the Supreme Court of the United States set forth 
the framework used to determine whether tribal subject matter jurisdiction exists 
in civil litigation over non-members.1 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit determined that the Belcourt Public School District (“School 
District”) was not subject to tribal jurisdiction despite its agreement with the 
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians (“Tribe”), and its location within the 
Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation (“Reservation”).2 The court held that the 
School District, acting as a governmental entity, was unable to enter to a private, 
consensual, commercial dealings with the Tribe as required to fulfill the first 
Montana v. United States exception. Because the Montana exceptions were not 
fulfilled, the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims.   
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
  “The School District is a political subdivision of the State of North 
Dakota.”3 The School District operates within the boundaries of the Reservation.4 
The North Dakota Constitution requires that all children within the School 
District must receive an education.5 For this reason, the Tribe and School District 
entered into a series of agreements in 2006 and 2009, recognizing their mutual 
responsibility to educate all children, Indian and non-Indian.6 These agreements 
provided that the School District had the exclusive authority over the daily 
operations of the Turtle Mountain Community High School.7 
  Several tribal members filed suit against the School District in Turtle 
Mountain Tribal Court (“Tribal Court”) alleging excessive force, defamation, and 
                                                        
1
  Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015). 
2
  Id. at 662. 
3
  Id. at 656 (citing Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. #1 v. State By and Through N.D. 
Legislative Assembly, 511 N.W.2d 247, 251 (N.D. 1994). 
4
  Id. 
5
  Id.; see N.D. Const. art. VIII, § 1. 
6
  Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist., 786 F.3d at 656. 
7
  Id.  
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multiple employment-related claims.8 Relying on Nevada v. Hicks,9 the Tribal 
Court dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction.10 The Tribe appealed to the 
Turtle Mountain Tribal Court of Appeals (“Tribal Court of Appeals”), which 
reversed.11 Noting that the School District knowingly signed an agreement with 
the Tribe subjecting itself to tribal jurisdiction, the Tribal Court of Appeals held 
that Hicks was not dispositive.12 The School District then filed an action in the 
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, seeking an 
injunction and a declaratory judgement stating that the Tribal Court lacked 
jurisdiction over the School District.13 Ultimately, the School District moved for 
summary judgment, which the district court denied.14  Distinguishing the case 
from Montana v. United States,15 the district court held that jurisdiction properly 
resided in the Tribal Court.16  
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the School District argued that the Tribal 
Court lacked jurisdiction over non-members because the Tribe had failed to 
demonstrate the applicability of either exception recognized in Montana.17 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Foundation of Tribal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Montana v. United States 
 
The general rule expressed in Montana is that a sovereign tribe lacks 
civil jurisdiction over the conduct of non-members on the reservation, unless 
their activities fall within one of two narrow exceptions.18 The first exception 
exists where the tribe and the non-members have entered into a consensual 
relationship through commercial dealings, contracts, or other arrangements.19 The 
second exception exists where the conduct of the non-members threatens or has 
direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, or welfare of the tribe.20   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8
  Id.  
9
  Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding, tribal courts lack jurisdiction 
over § 1983 civil rights actions to regulate state officials acting within their official capacities 
within the reservation). 
10
  Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist., 786 F.3d at 656. 
11
  Id. 
12
  Id.  
13
  Id. 
14
  Id. at 657; see Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 997 F. Supp. 2d. 1017, 1019  
(D.N.D. 2014). 
15
  Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
16
  Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist., 786 F.3d at 657. 
17
  Id. 
18
  Id. 
19
  Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 
20
  Id.  
  
 
2015 BELCOURT PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DAVIS 3 
 
I.  The First Montana Exception: Consensual Relationship with Tribe 
 
The School District argued that the agreements did not establish tribal 
jurisdiction under the first Montana exception because North Dakota law 
specifies that a school district cannot “authorize an agreement that enlarges or 
diminishes civil jurisdiction over matters that may be exercised by tribal 
governments.”21 The court agreed, and determined that the School District did 
not, through its contract with the Tribe, represent its intention to deviate from this 
law.22 
The Eighth Circuit further observed that even if the School District could 
agree to the expansion of tribal jurisdiction, the first Montana exception still 
would not apply. 23  The Tribe argued that a consensual relationship existed 
because the School District knowingly entered into a series of arrangements with 
the Tribe.24 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
have held that contractual relationships between tribes and government entities 
do not constitute consensual relationships as required by the exception.25 
The Eighth Circuit found Red Mesa Unified School District v. Yellowtail 
persuasive.26 In Red Mesa, the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona concluded that the Navajo Nation lacked jurisdiction over employment-
related claims against the Red Mesa School District, which operated within the 
boundaries of the Navajo reservation. 27  The court held that the relationship 
between the Navajo Nation and school district was not consensual because the 
relationship stemmed from a state-mandated duty to educate children.28 The court 
continued, stating that the first Montana exception fails because, despite the 
status of the Red Mesa School District as tribal lessees, the employment 
decisions at issue were made while the school district was operating within its 
governmental capacities, as mandated by the state constitution.29  
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the School District and Tribe did not 
enter into a private consensual relationship.30 The court determined that the Tribe 
and School District entered into an agreement because of a constitutionally-
imposed mandate requiring all children within North Dakota to receive 
education.31 The court, therefore, determined that the Tribe and School District 
did not enter into a consensual relationship as required for the first Montana 
                                                        
21
  Belcourt, 786 F.3d at 658 (citing N.D. Cent. Code § 54-40.2-08 (1983)).  
22
  Id..  
23
  Id. 
24
  Id. at 659. 
25
  Id. (citing County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F. 3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1998); 
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1074 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
26
  Id. (citing Red Mesa Unified Sch. Dist. v. Yellowhair, No. CV-09-8071-PCT-
PGR, 2010 WL 3855183 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2010).  
27
  Red Mesa, 2010 WL 3855183 at *5. 
28
  Id. at *3 
29
  Id. 
30
  Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist., 786 F.3d at 659. 
31
  Id. 
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exception to apply. 32  The court did not rule out the possibility that such a 
relationship could arise; only that it was not the case in the agreement between 
the School District and the Tribe.33  
 
II.  The Second Montana Exception: Conduct Threatening Welfare of Tribe 
 
The second Montana exception allows for tribal jurisdiction over non-
members if their conduct threatens the welfare of the tribe.34 The Tribe argued 
that the conduct of the School District injures the Tribe’s welfare.35 The court 
noted that not every event that impacts the tribe’s welfare, economy, or political 
integrity fulfills this exception.36 The court reviewed the narrow scope of this 
exception, citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 
which held the conduct of non-Indians must do more than merely injure the 
tribe.37 Indeed, the conduct must “‘imperil the subsistence’ of the Tribe.”38 In 
addition, Plains Commerce Bank held that tribal jurisdiction should only be 
allowed when “‘necessary to avert catastrophic consequences’” for the Tribe.39   
The court found Plains Commerce Bank persuasive, and concluded that 
employment and excessive force claims did not threaten the welfare of the tribe, 
as required by the second Montana exception.40 The court determined that the 
Tribe failed to prove that the conduct of the School District “imperil the 
subsistence” of the Tribe, or that the exercise of tribal jurisdiction was “necessary 
to avert catastrophic consequences.”41  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Belcourt Public School District v. Davis reaffirms the landmark cases 
concerning tribal civil jurisdiction in Montana v. United States and Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co. The court echoed the Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits, establishing that public school districts and tribes cannot 
enter into a consensual relationship as required by the Montana exception to 
establish tribal jurisdiction. This case shows that the first Montana exception is 
determinative on the court’s interpretation of a private, consensual relationship 
between the public entity and the tribe. The court then simply applied the 
Supreme Court’s previous decisions to negate the application of the second 
Montana exception. The court concluded that the Tribe failed to meet the burden 
                                                        
32
  Id.  
33
  Id. at 659 n. 4. 
34
  Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. 
35
  Id. at 660. 
36
  Id. at 659-60.  
37
  Id. at 660 (discussing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle 
Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008)). 
38
  Id. (quoting Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341) (emphasis removed). 
39
  Id. (quoting Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341) (emphasis removed). 
40
  Id. 
41
  Id. at 660-61. 
  
 
2015 BELCOURT PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DAVIS 5 
 
of proof that either of the Montana exceptions applied to establish tribal 
jurisdiction over the School District.42  Therefore, the district court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over the claims was proper.43 
 
   
                                                        
42
  Id. at 661.  
43
  Id. at 662. 
